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In accordance with cognitive dissonance theory, individuals generally avoid
information that is not consistent with their cognitions, to avoid psychological
discomfort associated with tensions arising from contradictory beliefs. Informa-
tion avoidance may thus make risk communication less successful. To address
this, we presented information on red meat risks to red meat consumers. To
explore information exposure effects, attitudes toward red meat and perceived
knowledge of red meat risks were measured before, immediately after, and two
weeks after exposure. We expected information avoidance of red meat risks to be:
positively related to (1) study discontentment; and (2) positive attitudes toward
red meat; and negatively related to (3) information seeking on red meat risks; and
(4) systematic and heuristic processing of information. In addition, following
exposure to the risk information, we expected that (5) individuals who scored
high in avoidance of red meat risks information to change their attitudes and per-
ceived risk knowledge less than individuals who scored low in avoidance. Results
were in line with the ﬁrst three expectations. Support for the fourth was partial
insofar as this was only conﬁrmed regarding systematic processing. The ﬁnal pre-
diction was not conﬁrmed; individuals who scored high in avoidance decreased
the positivity of their attitudes and increased their perceived knowledge in a simi-
lar fashion to those who scored low in avoidance. These changes stood over the
two-week follow-up period. Results are discussed in accordance with cognitive
dissonance theory, with the possible use of suppression strategies, and with the
corresponding implications for risk communication practice.
Keywords: information avoidance; cognitive dissonance; risk communication;
red meat; risk perception
1. Introduction
The communication of food risk presents an ongoing challenge for public health
experts, stakeholders, and policy makers (Barnett et al. 2011). Ideally, individuals
would be motivated to know or learn about risks to their health in order to enable
*Corresponding author. Email: Rui.Gaspar@iscte.pt
© 2015 Taylor & Francis
Journal of Risk Research, 2015
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13669877.2014.1003318
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [b
-o
n: 
Bi
bli
ote
ca
 do
 co
nh
ec
im
en
to 
on
lin
e U
Ev
or
a] 
at 
05
:58
 18
 Fe
br
ua
ry
 20
15
 
them to minimize adverse effects, for example, by reducing consumption of foods
with an associated health risk. Nonetheless, years of research in health psychology
(e.g. Hankonen et al. 2013), as well as in risk analysis (e.g. Kuttschreuter 2006),
suggest that this is often not the case. Different individuals have different levels of
motivation to seek additional information (Kuttschreuter et al. 2014), different
degrees of engagement with and deliberation on information about risk (Rutsaert
et al. 2015), and while some use it for their beneﬁt, some do not. Several psycholog-
ical factors inﬂuence an individual’s motivation to seek and attend to risk informa-
tion. Avoidance of information is one such factor. It refers to not wanting to know
information that will cause uncomfortable conﬂict in the individuals’ minds (Case
et al. 2005; Narayan, Case, and Edwards 2011). This ‘not wanting to know’ is an
initial barrier to effective risk communication, given that, even if the communication
is done in the most effective format and with the most effective content, this infor-
mation might not be attended to in the ﬁrst place. Therefore, individuals self-exclude
themselves from the communication process, right from the beginning. This is a
practical problem in risk communication that needs to be addressed.
To do this, we aimed to draw on cognitive dissonance theory to explore individ-
ual differences in the tendency to avoid risk-related information and corresponding
effects on the way individuals deal with risk information. In particular, we explored
the effects of presenting red meat risks information to a sample of red meat consum-
ers that varied in their tendency to avoid red meat risks information. In recent years,
there has been considerable media coverage of research on the links between red
meat consumption and early mortality, particularly of the results of the Pan and col-
leagues’ study (2012) according to which red meat consumption is associated with
an increased risk of cardiovascular diseases and cancer. Pan and colleagues’ study
results were reported by the media in many countries, including the UK (BBC News
online), Belgium (the newspaper De Standaard), and Portugal (the weekly magazine
Visão). Therefore, as a result of this increased social interest in the issue, even if
people sought to avoid information, it is likely that they were still involuntarily
exposed to it to some extent. This gives us an interesting opportunity to study the
effects of information exposure on people that did not want to receive it in the ﬁrst
place. This can allow us to understand if risk information avoiders are ‘lost causes’
for risk communicators or if, under certain circumstances, being exposed to risk
information may have positive effects on them.
We explored the effects of presenting red meat risks information on two variables
that we expected to change after the communication of risk. One was the individuals’
attitudes toward red meat, that is, the evaluations of whether red meat is good or bad.
There is evidence that risk information about food negatively inﬂuences attitudes (e.g.
Verbeke et al. 2007), which in turn inﬂuence intentions to purchase risk-related food
(e.g. Lobb, Mazzocchi, and Traill 2007). Another was the individuals’ knowledge
regarding red meat risks, in particular the individuals’ perceived knowledge regarding
the risk of consuming red meat. Following a communication of red meat risks to con-
sumers, it is expected that individuals’ attitudes toward red meat should become more
negative and the perceived knowledge to increase. However, when people tend to
avoid risk information will this also prove to be the case? One might think that there
is no use in presenting risk information to individuals who usually tend to avoid risk
information. As such, we explored whether the communication of risk information to
‘avoiders’ may be considered a ‘lost cause’ or whether there is indeed a beneﬁt of
devising a strategy to communicate information and expose ‘avoiders’ to it.
2 R. Gaspar et al.
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1.1. Information avoidance and cognitive dissonance theory
Information avoidance is a relatively understudied phenomenon in the risk commu-
nication literature, but work in this area has been growing in recent years. Case
et al. (2005) suggested that most theories and communication practice assume that
individuals actively seek information on health risk. However, much research has
showed that sometimes people actively avoid information. Information avoidance
has been illustrated among people living with HIV or AIDS (Brashers, Neidig, and
Goldsmith 2004), with regard to cancer information and genetic screening for cancer
(Case et al. 2005), and in the food risk context (Kuttschreuter 2006), among others.
It is important to note that information avoidance is not the mere absence of seeking
information. Several researchers have stressed that seeking and avoiding are related
but conceptually distinct, and that it is necessary to understand each concept in its
own right (e.g. Case et al. 2005; Kahlor et al. 2006; Narayan, Case, and Edwards
2011). For instance, screening the news to avoid reading about the risks of red meat
(information avoidance) is quite different from not engaging in an online search for
more information on the risks of red meat (the absence of information seeking).
Researchers on information avoidance assume that information may be avoided
because it will cause cognitive dissonance (e.g. Case et al. 2005; Narayan, Case,
and Edwards 2011). However, it remains unclear if, and how, information exposure
induces cognitive dissonance.
Cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger 1957; see Gawronski 2012, for a review)
postulates that inconsistent cognitions (such as contradictory beliefs, attitudes, or
behaviors) elicit an aversive state of psychological arousal or psychological discom-
fort: the state of dissonance. One area of research spawned by cognitive dissonance
theory focuses on the effects of selective exposure to information (e.g. Adams 1961;
Hart et al. 2009; Lowin 1967; Meertens and Lion 2011; Rhine 1967; Taber and
Lodge 2006). Insight into the concept of selective exposure to information allows
better understanding of information avoidance. Accordingly, people are motivated to
actively seek information that is consistent with their beliefs and to avoid informa-
tion that is not, because they anticipate that information will induce inconsistency.
Inconsistency between cognitions induces cognitive dissonance. Research results
have not always been supportive of the predicted effects of selective exposure to
information. However, a recent meta-analysis does conﬁrm a moderate preference
for information that is consistent with people’s cognitions, in comparison with infor-
mation that is not (Hart et al. 2009). This preference has also been conceptualized as
congeniality bias (e.g. Eagly and Chaiken 1993; Hart et al. 2009) or conﬁrmation
bias (e.g. Taber and Lodge 2006).
People are able to maintain and defend their attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors by
avoiding information that is likely to contradict them and by seeking information
that is likely to be consistent with them. For example, supporters of gun control
avoid information against gun control and seek information that conﬁrms gun con-
trol measures. On the contrary, opponents of gun control avoid information that
favors gun control and seek information against gun control (Taber and Lodge
2006). Hence, cognitive dissonance enables predictions about which individuals will
tend to avoid risk information.
By actively avoiding negative information, people can prevent being in a state of
cognitive dissonance. However, what happens when individuals that avoid risk
information are exposed to risk information? A practical question for risk
Journal of Risk Research 3
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communicators is whether presenting information on risk can still have an effect on
the attitudes and knowledge of the people who would otherwise avoid it. It is
psychologically difﬁcult to highly value or consume red meat and, at the same time,
believe that red meat consumption may pose serious health risks. In this line,
Verbeke and Vackier (2004) showed that the heaviest meat consumers reported
relatively lower risk importance and risk probability than other consumers. Berndsen
and Pligt (2004) also found that attitudinal ambivalence toward meat was related to
reduced meat consumption and that ambivalent consumers had greater intentions to
further reduce their meat consumption in the future.
1.1.1. Resolving cognitive dissonance
Individuals who avoid risk information are expected to experience cognitive
dissonance processes, following exposure to risk-related information. Dissonance
produces a desire to reduce the underlying inconsistency and to maintain a state of
consonance among one’s beliefs (Festinger 1957). One might expect that individuals
would revise their prior cognitions and change them in accordance with new infor-
mation. Nevertheless, one of the central assumptions derived from cognitive disso-
nance research is that individuals will not necessarily change their cognitions in the
presence of contrary information (Festinger 1957). Some ways of achieving consis-
tency do not imply change, as for example strategies that induce the distortion of
the communication content or that discredit the information source (Adams 1961).
What is crucial is that, in the end, the individual’s system of cognitions remains
consistent (Gawronski 2012).
Following on from the heuristic–systematic model (e.g. Chaiken, Liberman, and
Eagly 1989), we might try to anticipate more in detail how avoided information will
be dealt with. Accordingly, individuals process information in two qualitatively dif-
ferent fashions: systematic or heuristic. Systematic processing is ‘a comprehensive,
analytic orientation in which perceivers access and scrutinize all information input
for its relevance and importance to their judgment task, and integrate all useful
information in forming their judgment’ (Chaiken, Liberman, and Eagly 1989, 212).
Heuristic processing relies on the use of heuristics and requires less cognitive effort
and less cognitive resources. In line with cognitive dissonance theory, Chaiken,
Giner-Sorolla, and Chen (1996) proposed that individuals have defense motivations
when they desire to form judgments congruent with their interests, personal
attributes, or self-deﬁnitional beliefs. Information seeking has been related to
defense-motivated processing (e.g. Scherer, Windschitl, and Smith 2013), and it
might stimulate both heuristic and systematic processing. We suggest that
information avoidance, on the contrary, is likely to diminish processing. Individuals
who avoid information do not want to deal with information, and they might
simply not be willing to integrate the new information – either heuristically or
systematically.
1.2. Hypothesis development
This study goal was to analyze the effects of presenting red meat risks information
to individuals who naturally tend to avoid red meat risks information. We conducted
a longitudinal study based on a pretest design/posttest design with a follow-up two
4 R. Gaspar et al.
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weeks later. Red meat consumers were presented with information pertaining to vari-
ous red meat risks, in a sequence of seven internet pages (the content testers) that
had to be browsed. Changes in attitudes toward red meat and perceived knowledge
of red meat risks were explored. Measures were therefore taken at three time points:
immediately before (T1) and after (T2) exposure to the information, and again two
weeks after exposure (T3). These timings allowed us to analyze if changes occurred
and if these were sustained over a longer time period.
We had several hypotheses to test if risk information avoidance could be
explained based on cognitive dissonance theory.
Information avoidance would be positively related to the experience of disso-
nance. Information avoidance appears to protect against dissonance. Exposure to an
otherwise avoided information should lead to cognitive dissonance. Given that cog-
nitive dissonance is a state of psychological discomfort, we expected avoidance of
red meat risks information to relate to greater discontentment with the study.
Information avoidance would be positively related to attitudes. Information
avoidance appears to protect against dissonance by shielding attitudes from the
‘threat’ that inconsistent information might represent. Information avoidance should
happen to a greater extent when the individuals’ attitudes are inconsistent with the
information. Having an attitudes that positively support red meat is cognitively more
inconsistent with information on red meat risks. As such, avoidance of red meat
risks information should relate to having a more positive attitudes toward red meat.
Information avoidance would be negatively related to information seeking.
Avoiding and seeking information are related but conceptually distinct processes. As
studies on selective exposure to information have shown, individuals are not likely
to seek information that causes dissonance. Information avoidance should inhibit
information seeking. Hence, avoidance of red meat risks information should relate
to less seeking for additional information on red meat risks, which could be accessed
in the content testers.
Information avoidance would be negatively related to both systematic and
heuristic information processing. Avoidance of information should override the cog-
nitive processing of information, upon exposure to information that tends to conﬂict
with current beliefs. Building on the heuristic–systematic model, we envisaged that
information avoidance should relate to a decrease in the willingness to integrate the
avoided information. Therefore, we expected avoidance of red meat risks information
to relate to less cognitive processing of information – both systematic and heuristic
processing.
Information avoidance would relate to fewer changes in cognitions following
exposure to avoid information. Less processing of the avoided information should
be related to fewer changes in attitudes and perceived knowledge, for individuals
who avoid red meat risks.
In sum, we formulated the following hypotheses:
 Hypothesis 1: Avoidance of red meat risks information is positively related to
greater discontent with the study.
 Hypothesis 2: Avoidance of red meat risks information is positively related to
positive attitudes toward red meat.
 Hypothesis 3: Avoidance of red meat risks information is negatively related to
seeking for additional information on red meat risks.
Journal of Risk Research 5
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 Hypothesis 4: Avoidance of red meat risks information is negatively related to
both systematic and heuristic information processing.
 Hypothesis 5: Following exposure to the risk information, individuals who
otherwise avoid this information would show less change in their attitudes
toward red meat and their perceived risk knowledge than individuals who do
not avoid red meat risks information.
2. Method
2.1. Participants
Two hundred and forty four consumers were recruited to take part in the study (80
from the United Kingdom, 80 from Belgium, and 84 from Portugal). An interna-
tional recruitment agency (Toluna) organized the recruitment of participants for the
study in all countries. The recruitment involved quota sampling, aimed at achieving
an equal proportion in terms of gender, country, and those living with and without
children. The following criteria for sampling were applied: (a) all non-vegetarian,
consuming red meat at least once a week; (b) all with English/Dutch/Portuguese as
their ﬁrst language, respectively, in the UK/Belgium/Portugal; (c) minimum age of
18; (d) 20 parents living with young children under 10 for more than 50% of the
time; 10 females, 10 males; aged from 18 to 35; (e) 20 parents living with young
children under 10 for more than 50% of the time; 10 females, 10 males; all aged
from 35 to 50; (f) 40 participants who do not have children (25 females, 25 males)
spread over three age groups: 18–35; 35–50; and 50–65; (g) soft quotas for rural
urban vs. rural divide and age when leaving full-time education; (h) diversity in
occupational backgrounds. In addition, the following exclusion criteria were applied:
(a) no potential communication or reading difﬁculties (such as dyslexia) and (b) not
having participated in an online survey in the last month. Of the 244 consumers
recruited to complete the two-stage study, 174 agreed to participate, with 161 of
them (65.98%) completing all three time points, and 13 further participants (5.33%)
completing T1 and T2 only, thus achieving a valid sample of 174 respondents in
total (71.31%). Regarding the socio-demographic characteristics, there were 50.6%
women and 49.4% men. The most frequent age-group in the sample (21.8%) was
between 30 and 35 years old; 54.6% of the sample reported that they did not have
children; and 51.1% lived in a rural area, village, or small town, and 48.9% in a
large town or city. When asked about their educational level, the majority of the
sample (53.4%) said they completed college education. With regard to the ﬁnancial
situation during the last twelve months, on a scale from 1 to 7 (where 1 meant ‘I am
very well off’ and 7 ‘I have difﬁculties in paying the bills’), the mean value in the
sample was close to the mid-point (M = 4.14; SD = 1.51).
Seventy participants (33%) dropped out of the study before completing the ﬁrst
stage. With the goal of assessing the possible reasons for this dropout, we checked
for differences between participants who dropped and those who did not. No differ-
ences were found between them with regard to country of origin, gender, age group,
having children, living place, or ﬁnancial situation. Nevertheless, a marginally sig-
niﬁcant difference emerged regarding the education level, as more individuals with a
secondary education dropped out of the study than individuals with lower or higher
levels of education, χ2 (2, N = 241) = 5.90, p = 0.052, Cramer’s V = 0.156. We fur-
ther analyzed if the education level was related to the avoidance of information on
red meat risks, but no statistical relation emerged.
6 R. Gaspar et al.
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2.2. Procedure and instruments
This study was conducted using the online deliberation tool VIZZATATM.
VIZZATATM allows presenting the target audience with pieces of information
termed content testers. These can consist of text, images, or videos. The tool collects
data about information seeking pertaining to the content testers. For example, text-
based content testers include ‘glossary terms’ – highlighted words in the online text
which can be clicked on to reveal further information.
The procedure was as follows. At T1, participants were invited to the website of
the study and completed an initial series of measures: red meat risks information
avoidance, attitudes toward red meat, and perceived knowledge about red meat risks.
Immediately after T1, in a series of seven content testers, participants were presented
with information pertaining to red meat risks and beneﬁts. Thus, the study interest
in risk was not obvious to the participants. Information was included about health
and nutritional risks and beneﬁts, as well as about non-health risks and beneﬁts (e.g.
environmental, cultural, and socioeconomic) (Rutsaert et al. 2015).
Within content testers, glossary terms were highlighted and could be clicked on
by the participants in order to access additional information on risk or beneﬁts. The
number of clicks each participant made was registered. For instance, the following
information appeared in one content tester: ‘While red meat is generally safe and is
widely consumed by the public, its consumption has been linked to certain risks of
chronic disease. Chief among these are cardiovascular diseases and colorectal cancer
(also known as bowel cancer).’ The term ‘cardiovascular diseases’ was highlighted
and when clicked on the following additional information appeared:
Cardiovascular disease (CVD) is a broad class of diseases that involve the heart or
blood vessels (arteries and veins). The three main types of CVD are coronary heart dis-
ease, stroke, and peripheral arterial disease. Blood ﬂow to the heart, brain or body can
be reduced mainly because of a blood clot or a build-up of fatty deposits inside an
artery, leading to hardening and narrowing of the artery.
In sum, all participants received the same information and were able, if they wished,
to access additional information.
After exposure to information, we collected measures of attitudes toward red
meat, perceived knowledge of red meat risks, systematic processing, and heuristic
processing (thus at T2).
T3 occurred approximately two weeks after T2. At this point, participants were
asked to respond to a ﬁnal set of questions measuring again their attitudes toward
red meat, perceived knowledge, as well as indicating their overall satisfaction with
the study. The various measures used across the study are described in detail, below.
2.2.1. Information avoidance measure
The information avoidance measure was adapted from Shepherd and Kay (2012).
Participants were asked to what extent they agreed with the following four afﬁrma-
tions on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree): (1)
When it comes to the risk of eating red meat, I would be more comfortable to just
turn a blind eye to the issue; (2) When it comes to the consequences of eating red
meat, I would rather not know just how bad it is; (3) I would prefer to know the
whole story when it comes to the risk of eating red meat, regardless of how much
the truth hurts (inverted item); and (4) While there may be problems with consuming
Journal of Risk Research 7
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red meat, I would rather not know just how serious those problems are. Responses
were averaged into a composite measure with an adequate level of internal
consistency reliability (αT1 = 0.82).
2.2.2. Study discontentment measure
Most measures of cognitive dissonance have been developed in the area of consumer
research and focus on inconsistency between cognitions and consumption behavior
(e.g. Sweeney, Hausknecht, and Soutar 2000). By contrast, our study focuses on
inconsistency between various cognitions, which demanded the development of new
measures. In line with cognitive dissonance theory, inconsistency between cognitions
is expected to induce the state of psychological discomfort. Therefore, we measured
the individuals’ overall subjective experience of the study as an indicator of the cogni-
tive dissonance processes occurrence. At T3, four statements on a 7-point scale rang-
ing from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) assessed the participants’ feelings
toward the study: (1) I felt engaged during this study; (2) I valued having the opportu-
nity to ask questions and make comments in relation to red meat; (3) I very much
enjoyed reading about the risk and beneﬁts of red meat; and (4) I found the informa-
tion presented on the beneﬁts and risk of red meat very stimulating. Responses were
then reversed to provide a study discontent scale that would reﬂect a subjective nega-
tive experience of the study. These were averaged into a composite measure which
evidenced an adequate level of internal consistency reliability (αT3 = 0.91).
2.2.3. Attitudes and perceived risk knowledge measure
Attitudes toward red meat was measured through a semantic differential-type measure
(Osgood, Tannenbaum, and Suci 1957). Participants were presented four pairs of
opposite adjectives (bad–good, unsatisﬁed–satisﬁed, unpleasant–pleasant, and nega-
tive–positive) that ranged from 1 (the negative pole) to 7 (the positive pole) and asked
to circle the numbers best describing red meat. Responses were averaged into a com-
posite measure which evidenced adequate levels of internal reliability consistency in
each of the three time periods it was collected (αT1 = 0.86; αT2 = 0.94; αT3 = 0.93).
The perceived knowledge measure was adapted from Shepherd and Kay (2012).
Participants were asked to what extent they agreed with the following four afﬁrma-
tions on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree): (1)
I know many of the negative aspects of eating red meat; (2) I am conﬁdent that I
know enough about the risk of eating red meat; (3) I am not satisﬁed with my knowl-
edge about the risk of red meat for human health (inverted item); and (4) Overall,
the risk of red meat are something that I just ‘don’t get’ (inverted item). Responses
were averaged into a composite measure which evidenced adequate levels of internal
consistency reliability in the three periods it was collected (αT1 = 0.77; αT2 = 0.66;
αT3 = 0.70).
2.2.4. Information seeking measure
The number of participants’ clicks on red meat risk-related glossary terms was regis-
tered. As the average number of clicks per participant was low (M = 0.98,
SD = 1.74), a dichotomous variable based on this was created: no clicks (62.4%),
clicks (37.6%).
8 R. Gaspar et al.
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2.2.5. Systematic and heuristic processing of information measures
The systematic and heuristic processing measures were based on the self-report
measures validated by Smerecnik et al. (2012). Systematic processing assessed
the participants’ in-depth engagement with the information they read. Participants
were asked to what extent they agreed with the following ﬁve afﬁrmations on a
7-point scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree): (1) I
thought about what actions I myself might take based on what I read; (2) I found
myself making connections between the information and what I have read or
heard about elsewhere; (3) I thought about how the information on the beneﬁts
and risk of red meat relates to other things I know; (4) I tried to think about the
importance of the information for my daily life; and (5) I tried to relate the
details of what I read to my health. Responses were averaged into a composite
measure which evidenced an adequate level of internal consistency reliability
(αT2 = 0.81).
Heuristic processing assessed the participants’ use of heuristics to process the
new information received. Participants were asked to what extent they agreed
with the following three afﬁrmations on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (strongly
disagree) to 7 (strongly agree): (1) I spent little time thinking about the informa-
tion presented; (2) The pages I read did not contain useful information on
which to base my thinking about the risks and beneﬁts of red meat; and (3)
While reading about the positive and negative aspects of red meat, I did not
think about the details included. Responses were averaged into a composite
measure which evidenced an adequate level of internal consistency reliability
(αT2 = 0.71).
3. Results
Mean values and correlations between red meat information avoidance, study dis-
contentment, initial attitudes toward red meat, information seeking on red meat risks,
and information processing are presented in Table 1. On average, participants had
low risk information avoidance, were not discontented with the study, had a positive
attitudes toward red meat, sought little additional information on risk, and used more
systematic processing to integrate the information received than heuristic processing.
Hypotheses 1–4 were almost entirely corroborated (see Table 1). We expected
to ﬁnd a positive relation between avoidance of red meat risks information and
study discontentment (hypothesis 1). Data analysis supported this hypothesis. We
found a moderate positive relationship between information avoidance and study
discontentment.
Second, we expected to ﬁnd a positive relationship between avoidance of red
meat risk information and attitudes toward red meat (hypothesis 2). Data analysis
also supported this hypothesis. We found a moderate positive relationship between
information avoidance and attitudes.
Avoidance of red meat risks information was further expected to be negatively
related with seeking for additional information on red meat risks (hypothesis 3).
Data analysis supported this hypothesis. We found a moderate negative relation
between information avoidance and clicking on additional information on red meat
risks.
Journal of Risk Research 9
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Hypothesis 4 concerned the processing of avoided information. We expected to
ﬁnd a negative relationship between avoidance of red meat risks information and
processing of information. Data analysis sustained the hypothesis for systematic pro-
cessing but not for heuristic processing. We found a moderate negative relationship
between information avoidance and systematic processing of the information.
However, no relation was found with heuristic processing.
The results presented in Table 1 also provide support for the claim that informa-
tion avoidance and information seeking are related but might be conceptually dis-
tinct (Case et al. 2005; Kahlor et al. 2006; Narayan, Case, and Edwards 2011). The
behavioral indicator of information seeking behavior was not related to attitudes
toward red meat and had different relationships with information processing, being
positively related to systematic processing and negatively to heuristic processing.
Our last hypothesis concerned the changes in attitudes and perceived knowledge.
Mixed-design ANOVAs with time (T1, T2, T3) as a within-subjects factor and risk
avoidance (low, high) as between-subjects factor were conducted to explore the
effects that red meat risks information would have on attitudes and perceived knowl-
edge. The exposure to the information occurred between T1 and T2, with no manip-
ulation performed between T2 and T3. As such, we did not expect changes in
attitudes and perceived knowledge from T2 to T3, only between before (T1) and
after the exposure (T2/T3). To assess this, we used the Helmert contrast, comparing
T1 to the average of T2 and T3. Low and high avoiders were distinguished based
on their scores on the risk avoidance measure. A sub-sample of low and high avoid-
ers of red meat risks was extracted from the total sample in order to clearly under-
stand the effects of information avoidance. Individuals who scored below the 25
percentile on the red meat risks information avoidance measures (P25 = 2.00,
N = 44) were considered low avoiders of risk information. Individuals who scored
above the 75 percentile on the red meat risks information avoidance measures
(P75 = 4.00, N = 44) were considered high avoiders of risk information. We
expected that, following exposure to the risk message, individuals high in avoidance
of red meat risks information would change less their attitudes toward red meat and
their perceived risk knowledge than individuals low in avoidance of red meat risks
information (hypothesis 5). However, results did not support our expectations, as no
Table 1. Measures of central tendency and correlations.
Measure M (SD) 1 2 3 4 5 6
1. Information
avoidance
3.04 (1.13) 1.00
2. Study
discontentment
2.32 (0.97) 0.34*** 1.00
3. Attitudes (T1) 5.20 (1.25) 0.24** 0.02 1.00
4. Information
seeking
0.32 (0.46) −0.20** −0.21** 0.08 1.00
5. Systematic
processing
5.02 (0.86) −0.27*** −0.65*** −0.08 0.14 1.00
6. Heuristic
processing
3.26 (1.16) 0.13 0.28*** −0.08 −0.32*** −0.40*** 1.00
Notes: All measures but information seeking ranged from 1 to 7; higher numbers indicate more agree-
ment toward the measures’ content. Information seeking varied between 0 (no clicks) and 1 (clicks).
**p < 0.010; ***p < 0.001.
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interaction effects between time and avoidance emerged. High avoiders and low
avoiders similarly decreased the positivity of their attitudes toward red meat and
increased their perceived knowledge of red meat risks following exposure (see
Table 2).
We ﬁrst conducted the ANOVA including attitudes as the dependent measure. We
found main effects of time and risk avoidance, but their interaction was not signiﬁcant
(see Table 2). Results evidenced a decrease in attitudes positivity from T1 onwards, F
(1,81) = 8.94, p = .004. However, we also checked for differences between T2 and
T3, and, consistent with expectations, found none, F < 1. Results also evidenced that
high avoiders had a more positive attitudes toward red meat than low avoiders. This is
in line with our hypothesis that the avoidance of risk information is functional in pro-
tecting a positive attitudes. The interaction between time and risk avoidance was not
signiﬁcant, F < 1. Thus, both high avoiders and low avoiders expressed a less positive
attitudes toward red meat after exposure to the risk message.
We repeated the ANOVA considering perceived knowledge as the dependent
measure. We found a main effect of time (see Table 2). Neither the risk avoidance
nor the interaction effect was signiﬁcant, F < 1. Results evidenced an increase in
perceived risk knowledge from T1 onwards, F(1,80) = 18.72, p < 0.001. No differ-
ences emerged between T2 and T3, F < 1. This shows that at least subjectively, par-
ticipants have learned something from the information received and retained it in the
two-week follow-up period.
4. Discussion
This study aimed to provide a better understanding of how avoidance of information
on red meat risks might inﬂuence the effectiveness of red meat risks communication.
Speciﬁcally, it aimed to assess the effects of exposing people to information that
they would otherwise avoid. Building on cognitive dissonance theory, we illustrated
Table 2. Measures of central tendency and ANOVAs.
M (SD)
Variable Attitudes Perceived knowledge
Time 1
Low avoidance 4.85 (1.38) 4.32 (1.06)
High avoidance 5.51 (1.19) 4.10 (0.67)
Time 2
Low avoidance 4.62 (1.46) 4.67 (0.93)
High avoidance 5.01 (1.08) 4.75 (0.88)
Time 3
Low avoidance 4.58 (1.06) 4.68 (0.99)
High avoidance 5.06 (1.11) 4.58 (0.81)
F ηp2
Source Attitudes Perceived knowledge
Risk avoidance 5.10* 0.059 0.26 0.003
Time 5.29** 0.061 11.98*** 0.130
Note: Measures ranged from 1 to 7; higher numbers indicate more agreement toward the measures’ content.
*p < 0.050; **p < 0.010; ***p < 0.001.
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that information avoidance appears to protect people against dissonance by shielding
attitudes toward red meat from information on risk that may be inconsistent with
consumers’ positive views of it. Indeed, the results indicate that additional informa-
tion seeking on red meat risks may have been inhibited by an information avoidance
tendency. Faced with exposure to the information that otherwise would be avoided,
the participant’s information avoidance related to a decrease in the systematic
processing of information. Despite this latter result, when we differentiated between
individuals that were low and high in information avoidance, we observed that both
groups decreased their attitudes toward red meat and increased their perceived
knowledge of red meat risks, a change that was not predicted for avoiders. In addi-
tion, such changes were maintained in the two-week follow-up period. Although this
is a relatively short time span, nonetheless changes were maintained during this time
and were thus not simply an immediate and transitory reaction to the information
exposure.
4.1. Risk communication literature
Most expectations derived from cognitive dissonance theory were conﬁrmed. Cogni-
tive dissonance theory appears to be an adequate and fruitful approach for under-
standing risk information avoidance and considering tailoring risk communication to
the individual’s cognitions and affect. Indeed, much attention has been given in the
risk communication and risk perception literature with regard to information seeking
but not so much to information avoidance. The understanding of the effects and pro-
cesses that occur with regard to avoidance should therefore be given higher attention
in the literature, as they may function as a barrier to effective risk communication.
In this regard, cognitive dissonance is a core motivation of individuals (Gawronski
2012), and as such, its understanding might provide novel insights into a wide range
of phenomena in the risk perception and communication arena, which have not been
frequently studied from a cognitive dissonance perspective. Indeed, although being
now a classic theory, cognitive dissonance has recently regained researchers’ interest
for exploring its implications for risk communication (e.g. Meertens and Lions 2011).
We hope that our study may be a starting point in the understanding of information
avoidance from a cognitive dissonance perspective. Accordingly, future studies could
beneﬁt from exploring and directly manipulating the processes of cognitive
dissonance, in risk communication and risk perception research.
4.1.1. Information avoidance and systematic processing
Information avoidance was negatively related to systematic processing of informa-
tion. Nonetheless, individuals that were high in avoidance of red meat risks changed
their attitudes and perceived knowledge following exposure, similarly to individuals
that were low in avoidance. This result was unexpected and is quite challenging. It
illustrates that lower systematic processing of risk information related to changes
that are congruent with a better understanding of red meat risks. In addition, such
changes lasted in time. Research on the heuristic–systematic processing of informa-
tion suggests that new information is likely to have more lasting effects when it is
processed systematically (Chaiken, Liberman, and Eagly 1989). This was not the
case in the present study.
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We suggest that the suppression literature (see Wegner 1994) might shed some
light on this result. The suppression of unwanted thoughts is a strategy that consists
of actively trying to avoid thinking about a risk that is communicated. For example,
recent evidence shows that smokers use this strategy to suppress thoughts about
smoking-related risk (Kneer, Glock, and Rieger 2012). However, there may be rea-
sons to believe that this strategy may not be very successful. Many studies have
shown that attempting to suppress thoughts may actually result in a higher uncon-
scious activation of such thoughts when suppression is stopped, an effect known as
rebound (Macrae et al. 1994). In accordance, Salkovskis and Reynolds (1994) found
that smokers trying to suppress thoughts about smoking risk exhibited higher crav-
ings than smokers who did not try to suppress such thoughts. Wegner (1994) theo-
rized that this effect is caused by an automatic monitoring process that continues to
search for instances of the thought that needs be suppressed, resulting in an increase
of its accessibility. In this case, high avoiders of red meat risks information would
deliberately aim to suppress the thoughts about the red meat risks information they
were provided. Ironically, the use of this strategy may automatically increase the
accessibility of red meat risks information and, therefore, relate to a less favorable
attitude toward red meat and to an increase in the perceived knowledge of red meat
risks.
Information avoidance was not related to heuristic processing of information. It
might be the case that information avoidance speciﬁcally leads to a deliberate
decrease of systematic processing of information as a way to decrease unintended
thoughts and it does not trigger more or less heuristic processing. This is a
possibility worth examining in future studies.
4.2. Risk communication practice
Risk communications may change the evaluation of the risk object. Our main goal
in this research was a practical concern for risk communicators, that such outcomes
could not be observed when the individuals avoid knowing about risk, thus self-
selecting them out from the communication process right at the outset. These indi-
viduals could be seen as ‘lost causes’ and that the resources used to communicate
with them would be wasted on ineffective communication. Nonetheless, individuals
who scored high in avoidance of red meat risks information decreased the positivity
of their attitudes toward red meat and increased their perceived knowledge, and
these changes were stable within the course of our two-week long study. It was clear
that avoidance motivations refrained individuals from seeking risk information.
Nevertheless, when individuals were exposed to the information they tend to avoid,
there were similar changes to individuals who scored low in avoidance of red meat
risks information, that is, information exposure had the same effects for the two
groups. Hence, the challenge for practitioners in this regard may not be so much
providing different information content to avoiders and non-avoiders but rather
engage consumers in the communication process before exposure, based on different
engagement strategies tailored for avoiders and non-avoiders. This should be done
in a way that prevents avoiders of self-selecting themselves out from it, while main-
taining or increasing engagement for non-avoiders. In addition, it is also necessary
to design strategies to keep individuals with lower levels of education engaged in
the communication processes, as we found that these individuals dropped out more
than individuals with higher levels of education.
Journal of Risk Research 13
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Another important aspect pertains to red meat risks management. Food risk
managers may consider that, from the public perspective, there is information
overload. This information has somewhat been perceived as confusing, complex
(van Kleef et al. 2006), and even contradictory (Regan et al. 2014). The latter study
conﬁrmed that individuals exposed to contradictory risk-beneﬁt messages about red
meat were more likely to infer perceptions of conﬂicting information. Indeed, the
negative discourse around red meat has been substantial but often also inconsistent.
During the last 15 years, the discourse around red meat was characterized by a focus
on hormone residues and BSE at the end of the eighties, and evolving into messages
related to the possible impact of red meat intake on the incidence of cardiovascular
disease and different types of cancer (McAfee et al. 2010; Micha, Wallace, and
Mozaffarian 2010; Pérez-Cueto and Verbeke 2012). Verbeke et al. (2010, 287)
reported that in relation to beef safety information, consumers were generally aware
of the issues, but ‘some felt there is not enough information about beef safety, while
others felt they are faced with an overload of (sometimes conﬂicting) information.’
Therefore, communicating additional red meat risks, instead of managing risk, might
have no effect or even end up causing more confusion for consumers. This was
clearly not the case for this study, which provided evidence of lasting effects from
red meat risks communication. In particular, the increase of individual’s perceived
knowledge of red meat risks illustrates that individuals maintained the perception
that they had gained knowledge from the study.
Moreover, the study participants did not seek much for additional information on
red meat risks. Individuals, either avoiders or non-avoiders of risk information,
might not be motivated enough to actively seek for risk-related information. Never-
theless, in this study, risk information was easily available and presented in an ade-
quate content and format, and participants did perceive to beneﬁt from the
information that was presented. Therefore, researchers and practitioners need to
develop effective strategies to increase consumer engagement. Afterward, changes in
the individual’s cognitions appear to be likely, particularly when individuals are
exposed to and stimulated to attend to risk information (see Hart et al. 2009).
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